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Abstract 
Many discussions of the relations between religion and education develop critical accounts 
either of certain religious ideas or educational assumptions. This paper takes a different tack 
by resisting assessment of particular religious views or framings of religion within education. 
Rather the paper attempts to elaborate some of the educational implications that certain views 
of religion entail. The discussion focuses on two conceptions of religion: one a propositional 
or worldview framing of religion, and the other characterised here as a hermeneutic or 
aesthetic view of religion. Many of the typical problems of religions influence on education, 
such as indoctrination and the competing rights between various agents, are solved if we shift 
from the former view of religion to the latter. Furthermore, the implications of the two are 
suggestive of a particular conception of subjectivity as a free agent that make choices. It is 
that conception of subjectivity that is influential both within religion and education: within 
religion as the idea of a subject who chooses to believe certain religious doctrines, and within 




Efforts to discuss the connections between religion and education can involve a delicate 
balance: one is often cast either as a believer (by secularists and atheists) who is committed to 
developing an apologetics for religious influence upon education, or as a sceptic (by the 
religiously committed) who rejects any and all such influences. I propose the timely idea of 
the µpostsecular¶ as some kind of mediation to soften what has become a rather stale 
polarisation. However, invoking this concept will be regarded with particular suspicion by 
secularists who often repeat that we have never been secular, never mind postsecular. 
5HOLJLRXV SHRSOH PLJKW DOVR EH GLVDSSRLQWHG WR GLVFRYHU QR VLPSOH µUHWXUQ RI UHOLJLRQ¶
through the postsecular. There is a middle ground between sceptic and believer, and many of 
us find ourselves in this sense, betwixt and between. This logically excluded, but in practice 
quite expansive, middle place is not, of course, neutral. It may be a place from which to catch 
sight of certain framings of the debate, framings which too readily allow polarisation into 
believers and sceptics. Standing in this middle, requires careful analysis of terms which, to 
GUDZ RQ )RXFDXOW¶V JHQHDORJLFDO PHWKRG "we tend to feel [are] without history" (Foucault 
1980, 139). Certainly neither religion nor education are ahistorical, and so a genealogical 
orientation will be essential to what follows. But Foucauldian genealogy may not be 
methodologically adequate if we are holding out for something to be disclosed by way of the 
faculties of the incarnated consciousness, and so I present the tensions between the givenness 
of revelation and the projections of historical cultures, between history and truth, in terms of 
a hermeneutic phenomenology, a methodology that arises out of Heidegger, Gadamer and 
Ricoeur, and has begun to make substantial impacts upon contemporary discussions of 
religion and education (Aldridge 2016). 
I will try to resist defending any particular view of the nature of religion, of education, 
or of the legitimacy of any influence of one upon another. Concerning the term µSRVWVHFXODU¶
I will also attempt to remain circumspect, understanding it as a recognition of the persistence 
of religion, rather than as a celebration of its return. The postsecular moment does speak to 
the need for greater religious literacy, and sensitivity concerning the resurgent interest in 
religiosity around the world. So rather than defend any particular perspective on postsecular 
religiosity, I will explore the educational implications of what I regard as two related but 
fundamentally different conceptions of what it might mean to be religious, two conceptions 
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that reflect a much broader and more complex spectrum of lived religious experience. My 
argument requires me to say something about what education is as well, since this is also 
highly contested, ranging from indoctrination to persuasion to formation and so on. In 
particular, and to give a sense of the argument that will follow, there seems to me to be a 
tension between the necessity of pedagogical simplification or reduction, and concerns about 
the framing of religion in reductive propositional terms.  
My attempts at offering a systematic account, by showing the consequences of 
different conceptions of religion for education, rather than attempting to assess those 
conceptions directly, has the advantage that my argument will not be immediately rejected on 
the basis that I bring some bias, either for or against religious influence on education. Of 
course, I do not pretend to have no view or bias on this topic, but I hope that a more 
systematic account of the relations between different educational and religious ideas do not 
stand or fall on any own particular religious orientation which could be characterised as 
postsecular in only a limited sense. 
I define my own approach to postsecularism as concerned with the spaces between 
confessionalism (standing for one particular religious tradition) and atheism: this is a grey 
area in which religions have something important to contribute but not with the exclusivism 
and absolutism often associated with authentic confessional commitment. This is postsecular 
partly because it recognises that something broadly religious cannot be entirely eliminated 
from public life; at least not if we wish to entertain rather less parochial views of what it 
means to be religious that those absorbed only from modern Western Christian thought.1 The 
concept of the postsecular is an invitation to think about the complexities around the relations 
between religion and public life, driven in part by a need to reassess some of the founding 
assumptions of our geo-political order (Christoyannopolous 2014). So I would hope that this 
postsecular moment provides an opportunity to question the idea that, as José Casanova puts 
it, ³WREHVHFXODUPHDQVWREHPRGHUQDQGWKHUHIRUHE\LPSOLFDWLRQWREHUHOLJLRXVPHDQVQRW
yet full\PRGHUQ´&DVDQRYDI would particularly want to challenge what I take to 
be the educational equivalent:  that to be educated means to be secular, and therefore by 
implication, to be religious means not yet fully educated. 
A certain nineteenth and twentieth century progressive historicism continues to make 
itself felt through the ways in which, in Western contexts, freedom, democracy and laïcité 
(French secularism), are often associated, if not always straightforwardly aligned. Although 
not generally stated explicitly, this alignment of secularism, education, freedom and progress 
has been influential in interpreting the places of religion in education. In general, the 
influence has been to frame the relation between religion and education as a problem: for 
example, a problem of indoctrination, or a problem of competing rights and responsibilities 
between children, parents, religious communities, and the nation state. This competition of 
rights places children against parents, against, communities, and against the state: a 
Hobbesian ontology of violence is presupposed in which all are at war with all, and the 
Leviathan has to impose an order upon the chaos. The alignment of secularism, education, 
freedom and progress is problematic partly because it fails to recognize the critical resources 
immanent to religious traditions themselves (hermeneutical or interpretive resources that lie 
within complex religious and cultural histories). This leads to understandings of religion in 
rather reductive and univocal terms: as worldviews, or belief systems which are thought to be 
essentially exclusive and absolute in nature. Such a view of religion is, at least partial, and so 
one important sense of the postsecular is the opportunity it offers to think more broadly about 
                                                     
1 I have in mind here the idea that secularism is particularly a Western Christian construction, 
having its roots in the division of agesWKHµVDHFXOXP¶ or otherworldly age, and the worldly 
age (See Taylor 2007). 
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the nature and place of religion in present society. But I am attempting to resist assessing this 
interpretation of religion, rather I want to explore its educational implications. So, with (some 
of) my cards on the table allow me to present (for the sake of simplicity) the two forms of 
religion that I think characterise key points on a spectrum of religiosity. Particular traditions 
can be interpreted as sitting at different points on this broad spectrum, though I will say only 
a little about the µparticular¶ preferring to establish a few principles from which to interpret 
the particular.  
We can view religions as representing belief systems, worldviews, doctrines, truth 
claims and the like. This is a common-sense view of religion these days. It entails a view of 
religious positions as: absolute and exclusive; it involves the idea that different accounts of 
the world (e.g. religious and scientific) are competing with one another; or that there is a 
fundamental conflict of reason and religion (or criticality and conviction). Although I am 
going to suggest that this is not the only way to think about religion (and that there might be 
good reasons to think this view of religion is even, historically at least, relatively marginal), I 
want to state it as convincingly and directly as possible. So, to make the case that religions 
might be about absolute and exclusive truth claims, and that this is not (or not only) a secular 
or atheist positioning of religion (as people like John Milbank and Jamie Smith have 
suggested), but a view that many religious people themselves would subscribe to, consider 
the nature of religion as follows: Christians believe that Jesus Christ is the one and only 
incarnation of the word of God. For Muslims, WKH4X¶UDQ LV*RG¶V ILQDODQd unsurpassable 
revelation. A devout Jew would begin morning prayer with thanks to God for not having 
been made a heathen. And this exclusivism extends to forms of poly-theism and a-theism: the 
eternal Dharma of Vedic Hinduism pronounces that the almighty power of the Supreme 
Divinities is only One: Brahman. And Buddhists take the eightfold path to be the only way to 
enlightenment.2 Then there is the atheist belief in the fact of the non-existence of God or 
gods. 
This view of religion is often associated with a propositional approach to religion 
where religious truths are expressed a series of statements or facts. Unsurprisingly, this view 
is more often associated with so-called µUHOLJLRQVRIWKHERRN¶&KULVWLDQLW\-XGDLVP,VODP
in which revelation and proposition are fused into sacred text (Smith 1998). These facts are 
presented unproblematically as true which, if we are concerned with the most basic rules of 
logic, inevitably brings one set of propositions into tension with others. Moreover, this 
propositional account is often linked to what is sometimes called µProtestant voluntarism,¶ in 
ZKLFKUHOLJLRQLVLGHQWLILHGZLWKDGHFLVLRQRIIDLWKWRµGHFLGH¶WREHOLHYHLQWKHUesurrection, 
for instance (Strhan 2013). To be clear, my intention is not to argue against this view of 
religion which might require me to establish an alternative religious essentialism from which 
to denounce this view. Even though I think it is problematic, it applies to many contexts that 
are conventionally understood to be religious. Rather I want to suggest some implications for 
education of such a framing of religion. 
So alongside this framing in terms of propositional beliefs or worldviews, religion can 
also be viewed more hermeneutically or aesthetically. This conception understands religion 
less as a set of claims about how the world is, than as a way of seeing and being in the world. 
The truth here is less important than the symbolic power that religious narratives and 
practices offer. Or perhaps it is better to say that the conception of truth shifts from a literal 
one to a more metaphorical, poetic or aesthetic form. Religions have aesthetic and poetic 
power that might be experientially or morally significant, even if the religious statements are 
                                                     
2 This statement of the exclusive and absolute nature of religion is adapted from a very convincing critical 
analysis of this account by Morimoto (2016). Morimoto attempts to show how meaningful dialogue is made 
possible by the critical traditions within religions themselves. This argument clearly relates to my own though 
Morimoto is not directly concerned with education. 
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not taken to be factual. The hermeneutical (or interpretive) component here is important 
because this attitude understands religious life not as being bound to uncritical univocal 
orthodoxies, but as historically and socially constructed and inflected. From this perspective, 
religions are in dialogue with themselves as the histories of schism, reformation and 
revolution suggest. This is clearly a much messier view of what is means to be religious, 
standing upon less firm ground when attempting to determine who can be defined as within a 
religious group or what is definitive of a religion at all. This perspective emphasises the 
varied ways in which any given religion understands itself, acknowledging that variety, rather 
than excluding most of it as unorthodox (as the first definition of religion might tend to do).  
But the very concept of orthodoxy suggests, does it not, that religions seek to coalesce 
around, or ± drawing on the etymology of µUHOLJLRQ¶ ± to bind us to a correctness of knowing 
or understanding; that they are seeking to eliminate this variety even if it has to be tolerated 
from time to time. Perhaps the difference here hinges upon this idea of correctness (orthos). 
The root ortho refers to being straight, upright, rectangular, regular, true, correct, proper. Has 
this come to mean something rather too fixed and inflexible, either to be enforced by the 
demand to assent to a set of particular doctrines or practices? And this is clearly not just a 
problem for religious propositions and worldviews, but equally applies to religious practice. 
If we simply replace orthodoxy with orthopraxy, the hermeneutical component may still be 
absent. The hermeneutic framing of religion, by contrast, examines the idea of truth as 
correctness, or orthos. On the one hand, the propositional belief and worldview conception of 
religion indeed seeks to determine what is correct, while, on the other hand, the second 
aesthetic view seeks to explore the variety of religious perspectives as different ways of what 
the philosopher Paul Ricoeur called µfiguring WKHVDFUHG¶ (Ricoeur 1995). 
The issue may hinge on whether religion is regarded as a construction of the human; 
or even more significantly how we construct the idea of construction. In response to atheist 
confrontations, but also as a consequence of larger shifts within modernity, many theologians 
and philosophers of religion have come to terms with the constructed or projected nature of 
religious experience without thereby denying the significance, even the revelatory possibility, 
of that experience (Dupré 1998). One can, indeed today one surely must, acknowledge the 
projected aspects of human experience. But does that require us to assert that (religious) 
experience is only a human projection. This is essential to the second kind of hermeneutic 
account of religion. The hermeneutical account recognizes the constructed moment within 
religious understanding and experience. Most of us are familiar with the atheist critique that 
*RGLVDSURMHFWLRQRIWKHUHOLJLRXVVXEMHFW3HUKDSVZHGRQ¶WUHDOLVHWKDWWKLVLGHDRUDIRUP
of it) is also a central insight of Christian theology (and a part of all the great religions). The 
dLIIHUHQFHLVWKDWIRUWKHWKHRORJLDQ*RGLVQRWµMXVW¶WKHSURMHFWLRQEXWWKHSURMHFWLRQLVWKH
vehicle by which something can be encountered. In other words, the ways in which we 
µILJXUH (or construct) WKH VDFUHG¶ are attempts to open the religious subject, to make the 
religious subject sensitive to (or able to think) that which exceeds thought. The invokes the 
most complete, but also paradoxical, definition of theology as thinking that which exceeds 
thought. It involves a theological dialectic between knowing and unknowing (Turner 1999). 
The philosopher of religion Henri Duméry has put this dialectic in the following terms: 
Consciousness is projective, because it is expressive, because its objective 
intentionality cannot fail to express itself, to project itself on various levels of 
representation. This does not mean that these representations themselves become 
projected upon the objective essence, or upon the reality which this essence 
constitutes. When contemporary phenomenologists write that the thing itself [i.e. 
God] becomes invested with anthropological predicates and becomes known through 
those predicates, they merely allude to the need to represent the object in order to 
grasp its intrinsic meaning with all the faculties of the incarnated consciousness. But 
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WKH\ GR QRW GHQ\ WKDW WKH REMHFW WKH REMHFWLYH PHDQLQJ WKH ³WKLQJ LWVHOI´ RUGHUV
directs, rules the course of these representations (Duméry quoted in Dupré 1998, 10-
11) 
In other words, through the constructions of the religious subject, she is able to come into 
contact with something other: it is in this sense that we are engaged in constructing God. The 
idea of a constructed dimension of religious experience is here used to deconstruct the idol of 
absolute revelation upon which absolutist and exclusivist religious claims are built, though 
admittedly risking the very essence of that experience according to some people. I could 
LQYRNH -RKQ +LFN¶V SKLORVRSK\ RI UHOLJLRXV H[SHULHQFH WR DOORZ KXPDQ FDWHJRULHV RI
interpretation to frame the experiences of God, though developing this argument fully, is 
beyond my present scope (see Hick 2004). Thus revelation of God always entails the 
interpretive instruments of the religious subject, whether that is through texts, dialogues, 
feelings, or other experiences. The sacred can still be a reference point even if nothing is 
unconditionally sacred.  
Political commitments offer an alternative model for understanding this 
aesthetic/hermeneutic view but now highlighting an important deliberative component of 
religion which is particularly relevant for educationalists. Political promiscuity has become 
popular in the UK in recent years as political gaming has reached new levels both of idealism 
but also of cynicism. For some, this offers opportunities to make opponents less electable. 
For others, there is a serious possibility that one could simultaneously be part of multiple 
political parties, or at least that political engagement should be seen well beyond party 
politics. Whether being part of multiple political parties breaks certain social norms or party 
rules, it seems at least a practical possibility, suggesting interesting parallels for religious 
identity. Commitment to multiple political communities can be justified in terms of fostering 
deliberative culture, learning, engaging and belonging as widely as possible. It seems at least 
partly possible to view religious engagement and belonging in similar ways. The postsecular 
age can define the space in which many people find themselves: between the confessional 
commitment to a single religious community and the rejection of religion wholesale. So this 
aesthetic/hermeneutic view might also encourage us to understand religions deliberatively: as 
discursive communities that both express but also form ultimate concerns. From this point of 
view, it is less of an issue to commit to at least some dimensions of multiple religious 
lifeworlds. Just as one can enact multiple political principles through a wide engagement with 
political institutions and actors, so one can engage in religious understanding through 
participation in a range of different religious lifeworlds. This requires a certain shift in 
understanding what it means to be religious, since, from the perspective of the first definition, 
religious commitments appear to involve exclusive and absolute claims, a view that has a 
rather provincial history and context. 
I have tried, then, to show an alternative to the belief system and worldview 
conception of religion. The aesthetic/hermeneutic/deliberative view may be less familiar to us 
today, and ± given the pressure it puts upon the category of revelation ± would, no doubt, be 
highly controversial among certain groups. But there are significant histories in support of 
these ideas, which, furthermore have important implications for how we think about 
education. 
There are several implications for education. Consider the problem of indoctrination 
which characterizes much educational theory in this field. There are at least two points to 
make here. Firstly, the way in which indoctrination is discussed by educational theorists, but 
also in much wider discussions in politics and the media, about the place of religion in 
education tends to assume this belief system/worldview framing of religion. A more 
hermeneutical/aesthetic/deliberative account of religion would transform the nature of much 
of these debates. We could recognise the aim of religious education or upbringing to be less 
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about raising the child such that they assent to (or reject) a particular worldview as being true 
or false (or a set of given practices), and more concerning the child¶V encounter with complex 
historical traditions that involve ongoing interpretations and narratives that might have more 
or less significance to their own orientation. This may also involve an aesthetic encounter, 
where the religious expression takes a particularly aesthetic form: for example, the Cathedral 
choir evensong service, or the Buddhist sand mandalas. Arguments about the competing 
rights of Buddhists and Christians in these contexts seem to wholly miss the point.  
But even if we were to agree that religions are historically and culturally inflected in 
complex ways, and that they are to be aesthetically and hermeneutically understood, it is not 
obvious that we should introduce children to that complexity, or whether such complexity 
would aid religious literacy. The extent to which the child should experience the contested 
nature of a tradition is itself quite complex, since young children are often provided with a 
simplified representation of features of the world for the purposes of education. The 
pedagogical reduction of the world is a further problem that I will consider in a moment 
when exploring issues around the religious education curriculum. Some might object that I 
am naïve in thinking that religious people would be prepared to forego the exclusivist and 
absolutist foundations of their faith. I would respond, that this propositional framing that sits 
behind this exclusivism and absolutism does not seem to belong to any group, religious or 
not, but is part of a discursive milieu which frames the debates at a more subtle level. 
:KHWKHU WKLV LV LGHQWLILHGDVD)RXFDXOGLDQµUHJLPHRI WUXWK¶RU+HLGHJJHULDQRQWRORJ\ WKH
framing seems to precede our general discussions of the place of religion within education, 
determining the kinds of questions that seem relevant and the kinds of answers that seem 
convincing. 
My second concern with indoctrination is that it is not an issue specific to religion and 
education, but is a general problem for any education that inhibits rational autonomy. There 
is good reason to suppose that religious communities encourage greater degrees of autonomy 
than some political or social communities. Harry Brighouse, for instance, has argued that 
secular schools in the USA are no more autonomy enhancing (if that is our educational goal) 
than publically funded faith schools in other parts of the world, and may even be less so since 
the forms of coercion and manipulation are concealed by an assumption of secular neutrality 
(Brighouse 2006). James Smith has developed a similar argument concerning what he calls 
µFXOWXUDOOLWXUJLHV¶ in which non-religious spaces are shown to engage in formative practices 
intended to shape or manipulate the desires of children in terms that are at least as harmful to 
autonomy as many religious liturgies (Smith 2013). So indoctrination as an issue is clearly 
one that cuts across the secular/religious divide. 
If we turn to religious education (RE) as a curriculum subject, then the worldview 
framing of religion really comes into its own. Religions are quite literally framed onto 
textbook tables with headings such as µGHLW\¶µIRXQGHU¶µKRO\ERRN¶µEHOLHI.¶ Now, I am all 
for some kind of pedagogical reduction and selection which I take to be essential to teaching 
and learning. But this kind of enframing demonstrates how important it is that such 
pedagogical reductions should be hermeneutically charged by being self-conscious and self-
subvertive. Such hermeneutic qualities appear to be distant from the typical treatment of 
comparative religions in RE. Comparison itself raises many other heated debates. These 
debates tend to create a conflict between those who see RE as reducing religious views to a 
kind of bland pluralism (which at least is in some sense inclusive of all VWXGHQWV¶ 
perspectives) vs. the recognition that something significant (or absolute) is at stake in 
religion. The point is that teachers of RE GRQ¶W TXLWH NQRZ KRZ WR PHGLDWH EHWZHHQ WKH
absolute and exclusive claims of religions, and the plurality present in the class. The solution 
tends to be tolerance and respect (which is something) but which also involves placing the 
existential dimensions of lived religion in the private sphere, and reducing public religious 
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debate to an examination of the outer shell of religious life. The hermeneutic/aesthetic 
framing of religion could define RE as offering spaces in which deliberative culture and 
aesthetic interpretation can be nourished: teachers of RE would need to take seriously the 
different views of students without forcing those views to be interpreted as irreconcilable and 
therefore ultimately private. All parties would need to understand their own interpretive 
histories and how those histories affect the way religious insights are expressed. They may 
even embrace multiple religious identities: being Hindu Muslims, Christian Buddhists and so 
on. And some of the more extreme positions adopted in the name of religion would, I 
suggest, be moderated by exposure to deliberative cultures that appear as good RE.  
These considerations also bear upon the general nature of education. In liberal 
Western societies we take the development of rational autonomy to be an important (or even 
the central) goal of education. And yet in all sorts of ways adults and teachers restrict the 
autonomy of children in order to impart values that they consider to be important (taken to be 
more important than autonomy). For instance, political commitments are expressed by 
parents, teachers and the structures of social life. Parents and teachers also wish to inculcate 
aesthetic sensibilities. The kind of restriction on autonomy is often levelled at religion, but, 
again appears to reflect the worldview/belief system framing of religion. The faith school 
debates engage with this controversial and complex area. We can wonder, for instance, 
whether rational autonomy is facilitated by the existence of faith schools. A typical argument 
will be that faith schools attempt to restrict the exposure of young people to a range of 
different perspectives, thereby inhibiting the extent to which autonomous choices about the 
good life can be made. For example, a Catholic school might prioritise Catholic teachings 
and practices over that of others. More radically perhaps, Amish children are allowed to exit 
statutory education in the USA two years earlier than their non-Amish peers so as to retain 
strong links with Amish culture and religion. Insofar as they restrict the autonomy of the 
child, these restrictions could be regarded as illegitimate. But here the Amish or Catholic 
parent, or the wider Amish or Catholic community, might have genuine concerns about the 
inculcation of other values, values which they regard as equally, or even more corrosive to 
the rational autonomy of the child (relating to consumerism or materialism). 
I can only touch on these issues in this short paper, but in terms of the two 
conceptions of religion discussed above, these arguments around autonomy tend to place the 
emphasis upon the rationalist conception of religious life, related to worldviews and belief 
systems. I suspect that a particular construction of rational subjectivity lies behind both 
religion and education, structuring their interactions. The influence of the construction of the 
rational subject on religious understanding, as well as its rather parochial provenance, has 
been discussed by Wendy Brown: 
The conceit of religion as a matter of individual choice . . . is already a distinct (and 
distinctly Protestant) way of conceiving religion, one that is woefully inapt for Islam 
and, I might add, Judaism, which is why neither comports easily with the privatized 
individual religious subject presumed by the formulations of religion freedom and 
tolerance governing Euro-Atlantic modernity (Brown 2013, 17) 
There is more to be said here, but the notion of education as the formation of the autonomous 
rational subject who is capable of, and responsible for, making choices seems to have become 
naturalised. That idea of the autonomous subject shapes the conception of religious choices 
for one (or no) particular religion. In short, our conceptions of religion and education are 
inextricably bound up together. When we imagine that education is about the formation of 
rational subjects (a view that I am not rejecting, despite it being quite problematic), we 
should consider the framing of rational subjectivity itself: we should not view that subject as 
an ahistorical one. The ahistorical subject for whom religious identity is a matter of 
individual choice frames religion in propositional and worldview terms, which itself 
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determines the nature of debate around the relations between religion and education. Clearly, 
these ideas could be extended to questions of political education, citizenship, patriotism, 
moral development or becoming happy. But because religion is most explicitly to do with 
that which concerns us ultimately, and generally entails some form of transcendence to define 
of express that concern, then religions power to exclude and assert absolutes is strong. These 
issues are all educationally significant, and all take up particular ideas of what it means to be 
a subject who makes choices, or in more sociological language, an agent whose agency 
always resides within a larger structure that shapes what is and is not possible. 
I have not successfully concealed my own bias. My arguments reveal my own 
commitment to reinterpreting religion in hermeneutical/aesthetic/deliberative terms. But I 
hope I have begun to draw attention to some of the implications of the particular views as 
they play out in educational debates whatever view of religion one takes. I hope I have drawn 
attention not to questions of indoctrination and competing truth claims, but to the framing of 
the debate about religion and education which tends to take these questions as its point of 
departure. I hope to have indicated new possible points of departure upon the question of the 





Aldridge, D. (2016). A Hermeneutics of Religious Education, London: Bloomsbury. 
Brighouse, H. (2006). On Education, London: Routledge.͒ 
%URZQ:µ,QWURGXFWLRQ¶LQ$VDGHWDOIs Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and 
Free Speech. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Fordham University Press, 7±19.͒ 
CDVDQRYD-³$6HFXODU$JH'DZQRU7ZLOLJKW"´LQ0LFKDHO:DUQHU-RQDWKDQ9DQ 
Antwerpen, and Craig Calhoun (eds.) Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 265±281.͒ 
Christoyannopolous, A. (2014). ³7KH *ROGHQ 5XOH RQ WKH *UHHQ 6WLFN Leo 7ROVWR\¶V
InterQDWLRQDO 7KRXJKW IRU D µ3RVWVHFXODU¶ $JH´ LQ /XFD 0DYHOOL DQG )DELR 3HWLWR
(eds.) Towards a Postsecular International Politics: New Forms of Community, 
Identity, and Power. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 81±102.  
Dupré, L. (1998). Religious Mystery and Rational Reflection. Michigan: Eerdmans.͒ 
Foucault, Michel (1980). Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and 
Interviews. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 
Hick, J. (2004). An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, (2nd 
edn) (New Haven, Yale University Press). 
Milbank, J. (2010). ³$ &ORVHU :DON RQ WKH :LOG 6LGH´ LQ :DUQHU Vanantwerpen, and 
Calhoun (eds.) Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 54±82.  
Morimoto, A. (2005). Understanding the people of other faiths: conviviality among religions. 
In Y. Murakami, N. Kawamura & S. Chiba (Eds.) Toward a peaceable future: 
redefining peace, security, and kyosei from a multidisciplinary perspective (Seattle, 
Washington State University Press), 179-189.  
Ricoeur, P. (1995). Figuring the Sacred, Fortress Press. 
Smith, W. (1998). Faith and Belief. Princeton: Princeton University Press.͒ 
Smith, J. (2013). Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic. 
Strhan, A. (2013). ³3UDFWLVLQJ WKH 6SDFH %HWZHHQ (PERG\LQJ %HOLHI DV DQ (YDQJHOLFal 
AngliFDQ6WXGHQW´Journal of Contemporary Religion, 28: 2, 225±239.͒ 
9 
 
Taylor, C. (2007). A Secular Age, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Turner, D. (1999). The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
